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We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods under the assumption
that the goods form an undirected graph and each agent must receive a
connected subgraph. Our focus is on well-studied fairness notions including
envy-freeness and maximin share fairness. We establish graph-specific max-
imin share guarantees, which are tight for large classes of graphs in the case
of two agents and for paths and stars in the general case. Unlike in previous
work, our guarantees are with respect to the complete-graph maximin share,
which allows us to compare possible guarantees for different graphs. For in-
stance, we show that for biconnected graphs it is possible to obtain at least
3/4 of the maximin share, while for the remaining graphs the guarantee is at
most 1/2. In addition, we determine the optimal relaxation of envy-freeness
that can be obtained with each graph for two agents, and characterize the
set of trees and complete bipartite graphs that always admit an allocation
satisfying envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) for three agents. Our work
demonstrates several applications of graph-theoretical tools and concepts to
fair division problems.
1. Introduction
We consider a classical resource allocation setting where a set of goods are to be al-
located among interested agents. Our goal is to find an allocation that is fair to all
agents. This problem has been addressed in a large body of literature on fair division
[Brams and Taylor, 1996a; Moulin, 2003], which has found applications ranging from
divorce settlement [Brams and Taylor, 1996b] to credit assignment [de Clippel et al.,
2008]. The two most prominent fairness notions in the literature are envy-freeness and
proportionality. An allocation is said to be envy-free if every agent likes her bundle at
least as much as any other agent’s bundle, and proportional if every agent receives value
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at least 1/n of her value for the entire set of goods, where n denotes the number of
agents.
Our focus in this paper is on the setting where we allocate indivisible goods. This
pertains to the allocation of houses, cars, artworks, electronics, and many other common
items. When goods are indivisible, neither envy-freeness nor proportionality can always
be fulfilled.1 As a result, relaxations of both notions have been studied. Envy-freeness
is often relaxed to envy-freeness up to one good (EF1)—this means that any envy that
an agent has towards another agent can be eliminated by removing a good from the
latter agent’s bundle. An EF1 allocation exists for any number of agents with arbitrary
monotonic valuations [Lipton et al., 2004]. Likewise, proportionality can be relaxed to
maximin share fairness—the maximin share (MMS) of an agent is the largest value that
an agent can guarantee for herself if she is allowed to divide the goods into n parts and
always receives the worst part. An allocation that gives every agent her maximin share—
said to satisfy maximin share fairness—does not always exist for additive valuations, but
a constant multiplicative approximation can be obtained [Kurokawa et al., 2018].
Perhaps the most well-known fair division protocol is the cut-and-choose protocol,
which can be used to allocate a divisible good between two agents. In this protocol, the
first agent divides the good into two equal parts (this is possible because the good is
divisible), and the second agent chooses the part that she prefers. The cut-and-choose
protocol has a direct analogue in the indivisible goods setting: since an equal partition
may no longer exist, the first agent now divides the goods into two parts that are as equal
as possible in her view. The resulting allocation is guaranteed to satisfy both maximin
share fairness and EF1.2 However, these guarantees rely crucially on the assumption
that any allocation of the goods to the two agents can be chosen—in reality, there are
often constraints on the allocations that we desire. One common type of constraints is
captured by a model of Bouveret et al. [2017], where the goods are vertices of a connected
undirected graph and each agent must be allocated a connected subgraph. For instance,
the goods could represent offices in a university building that we wish to divide between
research groups, and it is desirable for each group to receive a connected set of offices
in order to facilitate communication within the group. To what extent do the fairness
guarantees continue to hold when connectivity constraints are imposed, and how does
the answer depend on the underlying graph?
1.1. Our Contributions
In this paper, we make several contributions to the active line of work on fairly allo-
cating indivisible goods under connectivity constraints.3 While we also provide fairness
guarantees for any number of agents, the majority of our results concern the setting of
two agents. We emphasize here that this setting is fundamental in fair division. Indeed,
a number of fair division applications including divorce settlements, inheritance division,
1Consider two agents trying to divide a single valuable good.
2In fact, it also satisfies a stronger relaxation of envy-freeness called envy-freeness up to any good (EFX)
[Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018].
3We survey this line of work in Section 1.2.
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and international border disputes often fall into this setting, and numerous prominent
works in the field deal exclusively with the two-agent case (e.g., [Brams and Fishburn,
2000; Brams et al., 2012, 2014; Kilgour and Vetschera, 2018]).4
First, in Section 3 we study maximin share fairness for agents with additive valuations.
We define the price of connectivity (PoC) of a graph to be the largest gap between the
graph maximin share (G-MMS), which is defined over all partitions that respect the
connectivity constraints of the graph, and the maximin share defined over all possible
partitions (in other words, the maximin share defined over the complete graph). We show
that in the case of two agents, this quantity precisely captures the MMS approximation
that can be guaranteed. In other words, if a graph has a PoC of α for two agents, then
there always exists an allocation that gives both agents α times their MMS, and the
factor α is tight. The same is true for any number of agents provided that the graph is
a tree.
With this equivalence in hand, we proceed to determine the PoC for various graphs.
In the two-agent case, we show that the PoC is related to the vertex connectivity of the
graph, i.e., the minimum number of vertices whose deletion disconnects the graph. For
graphs with connectivity exactly 1, including all trees, we show that the PoC is 1/k
where k is the maximum number of connected components that result from deleting one
vertex. As a consequence, the PoC is at most 1/2 for any graph in this class. On the
other hand, we show a lower bound of 3/4 for all graphs with connectivity at least 2—
this bound is tight for all graphs with connectivity exactly 2 and, perhaps surprisingly,
for certain graphs with connectivity up to 5.
For any number of agents, we establish a general lower bound of 1/(m − n + 1) for
the PoC, where m and n denote the number of goods and agents, respectively; this
implies the existence of a connected allocation with regard to any graph that gives every
agent at least 1/(m− n+ 1) of their MMS. We also derive the exact PoC for paths and
stars. Notably, in order to establish the PoC for paths, we introduce a new relaxation
of proportionality that we call the indivisible proportional share (IPS) property. This
notion strengthens a number of relaxations of proportionality in the literature while
maintaining guaranteed existence, and may therefore be of independent interest.
Next, in Section 4 we turn our attention to envy-freeness relaxations and allow agents
to have arbitrary monotonic valuations. In the case of two agents, Bilo` et al. [2019]
characterized the graphs for which an EF1 allocation always exists as the graphs that
admit a “bipolar ordering” (defined in Section 2). While the characterization yields a
strong fairness guarantee for this class of graphs, it does not give any guarantee for
the remaining graphs. We generalize this result by providing the optimal relaxation of
envy-freeness for every graph—specifically, for each graph, we determine the smallest
k for which an allocation that is envy-free up to k goods (EFk) always exists with two
agents. As a corollary, we show that an EF(m − 2) allocation exists for any connected
graph, and the bound m − 2 is tight for stars. By contrast, we show that the fairness
notion envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), which is stronger than EF1, can only be
4See also [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2019] for further discussion on the importance of the two-agent
setting.
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guaranteed for complete graphs with two agents. We then address the case of three
agents, where we characterize the set of trees and complete bipartite graphs that admit
an EF1 allocation for arbitrary valuations.
From a technical point of view, our work makes extensive use of tools and concepts
from graph theory, including vertex connectivity, linkedness, ear decomposition, bipolar
ordering, and block decomposition. While bipolar ordering and block decomposition
have been used by Bilo` et al. [2019] in the EF1 characterization that we mentioned, the
other concepts have not previously appeared in the fair division literature to the best
of our knowledge. We believe that establishing these connections enriches the growing
literature and lays the groundwork for fruitful collaborations between researchers across
the two well-established fields.
Finally, we remark that with the exception of Theorem 3.11, all of our guarantees
are constructive. In particular, we exhibit polynomial-time algorithms that produce
allocations satisfying the guarantees.
1.2. Related Work
Fair allocation of indivisible goods has received considerable attention from the research
community, especially in the last few years. We refer to surveys by Thomson [2016],
Markakis [2017], and Moulin [2019] for an overview of recent developments in the area.
The papers most closely related to ours are the two papers that we mentioned, by
Bouveret et al. [2017] and Bilo` et al. [2019]. Bouveret et al. showed that for any number
of agents with additive valuations, there always exists an allocation that gives every agent
her maximin share when the graph is a tree, but not necessarily when the graph is a
cycle. It is important to note that their maximin share notion corresponds to our G-
MMS notion and is defined based on the graph, with only connected allocations with
respect to that graph taken into account in an agent’s calculation. As an example of
a consequence, even though a cycle permits strictly more connected allocations than
a path, it offers less guarantee in terms of the G-MMS. Our approach of considering
the (complete-graph) MMS allows us to directly compare the guarantees that can be
obtained for different graphs.
Bilo` et al. [2019] investigated the same model with respect to relaxations of envy-
freeness. As we mentioned, they characterized the set of graphs for which EF1 can be
guaranteed in the case of two agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations. Moreover,
they showed that an EF1 allocation always exists on a path for n ≤ 4. Intriguingly, the
existence question for n ≥ 5 remains open, although they showed that an EF2 allocation
can be guaranteed for any n.
Besides Bouveret et al. [2017] and Bilo` et al. [2019], a number of other authors have
recently studied fairness under connectivity constraints. Lonc and Truszczynski [2018]
investigated maximin share fairness in the case of cycles, also concentrating on the G-
MMS notion, while Suksompong [2019] focused on paths and provided approximations
of envy-freeness, proportionality, as well as another fairness notion called equitability.
Igarashi and Peters [2019] considered fairness in conjunction with the economic efficiency
notion of Pareto optimality. Bouveret et al. [2019] studied the problem of chore division,
4
where all items yield disutility to the agents, and gave complexity results on deciding
the existence of envy-free, proportional, and equitable allocations for paths and stars.
Considering connected allocations can also be useful in settings where we are not
interested in connectedness per se, or perhaps the goods do not even lie on any graph.
A technique that has received interest recently is to arrange the goods on a path and
compute a connected allocation with respect to the path. Variants of this technique have
been used to devise algorithms that find a fair allocation using few queries [Oh et al.,
2019] or divide goods fairly among groups of agents [Segal-Halevi and Suksompong, 2018;
Kyropoulou et al., 2019].
A related line of work also combines graphs with resource allocation, but uses graphs to
capture the connection between agents instead of goods. In particular, a graph specifies
the acquaintance relationship among agents. Abebe et al. [2017] and Bei et al. [2017]
defined graph-based versions of envy-freeness and proportionality with divisible resources
where agents only evaluate their shares relative to other agents with whom they are
acquainted. Beynier et al. [2018] and Bredereck et al. [2018] studied the graph-based
version of envy-freeness with indivisible goods. Aziz et al. [2018] introduced a number
of fairness notions parameterized by the acquaintance graph.
Besides graphs, other types of constraints that have been considered in the litera-
ture include cardinality constraints [Biswas and Barman, 2018] and matroid constraints
[Gourve`s and Monnot, 2019].
2. Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of agents, and M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} the set of goods.
There is a bijection between the goods inM and them vertices of a connected undirected
graph G; we will refer to goods and vertices interchangeably. A bundle is a subset of
goods, and an allocation is a partition ofM into n bundles (M1, . . . ,Mn) such that agent
i receives bundle Mi. A bundle is called connected if the goods in it form a connected
subgraph of G, and an allocation or a partition is connected if all of its bundles are
connected. We assume in this paper that allocations are required to be connected.
Each agent i has a nonnegative valuation ui(M
′) for each bundle M ′ ⊆ M , where
we assume without loss of generality that ui(∅) = 0 for all i. For a good g ∈ M , we
will use ui({g}) and ui(g) interchangeably. A valuation u is said to be monotonic if
u(M ′′) ≤ u(M ′) for all M ′′ ⊆ M ′ ⊆ M . It is additive if u(M ′) =
∑
g∈M ′ u(g) for all
M ′ ⊆ M , and binary if it is additive and u(g) ∈ {0, 1} for all g ∈ M . An instance
consists of the goods, their underlying graph, the agents, and their valuations for the
goods.
We assume throughout the paper that valuations are monotonic, and in the con-
text of maximin share fairness (Section 3) that they are additive. The additivity as-
sumption is commonly made in the fair division literature, especially when studying
maximin share fairness [Bouveret et al., 2017; Caragiannis et al., 2016; Dickerson et al.,
2014; Kurokawa et al., 2018; Lonc and Truszczynski, 2018].
We are ready to define the fairness notions that we consider in this paper, starting
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with maximin share fairness [Budish, 2011].
Definition 2.1. Given a graph G, an additive valuation u, and the number of agents
n, the graph maximin share (G-MMS) for G,u, n is defined as
G-MMS(G,u, n) := max
(M1,...,Mn)
min
i=1,...,n
u(Mi),
where the maximum is taken over all partitions (M1, . . . ,Mn) that are connected with
respect to G. The maximin share (MMS) for u, n is defined as
MMS(u, n) := G-MMS(CG, u, n),
where CG denotes the complete graph over the goods. When the parameters are clear
from the context, we will refer to the graph maximin share and the maximin share simply
as G-MMS and MMS, respectively. A partition for which the maximum is attained is
called a G-MMS partition (resp., MMS partition).
It follows from the definition that
G-MMS(G,u, n) ≤ MMS(u, n) ≤
u(M)
n
for all G,u, n, and that G-MMS(G1, u, n) ≤ G-MMS(G2, u, n) if G1 is a subgraph of G2.
Moreover, we have G-MMS(G,u, n) = MMS(u, n) = 0 if m < n.
Next, we define the price of connectivity.
Definition 2.2. Given a graph G and the number of agents n, the price of connectivity
(PoC) of G for n agents is defined as
inf
u
G-MMS(G,u, n)
MMS(u, n)
,
where the infimum is taken over all possible additive valuations u.5 We denote the PoC
of a graph G for n agents by PoC(G,n).
When G and n are clear from the context, we will refer to PoC(G,n) simply as PoC.
Note that the PoC is always at most 1, and is exactly 1 for complete graphs of any size.
Moreover, the PoC is 1 if m ≤ n.
We now introduce relaxations of envy-freeness [Lipton et al., 2004; Caragiannis et al.,
2016].
Definition 2.3. An allocation (M1, . . . ,Mn) satisfies
• envy-freeness up to k goods (EFk), for a given nonnegative integer k, if for any
agents i, j, there exists a (possibly empty) bundle M ′ ⊆ Mj with |M
′| ≤ k such
that ui(Mi) ≥ ui(Mj\M
′).
5We assume that 0
0
= 1.
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• envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) if for any agents i, j and any good g ∈ Mj,
we have ui(Mi) ≥ ui(Mj\{g}).
An EF0 allocation is said to be envy-free. It follows immediately from the definition
that envy-freeness implies EFX, which in turn implies EF1. If we allow incomplete
allocations, achieving envy-freeness and all of its relaxations is trivial, for example by
simply not allocating any good. Hence we will assume that all goods must be allocated
when we discuss envy-freeness and its relaxations.
All graphs considered in this paper are assumed to be connected. The vertex connec-
tivity (or simply connectivity) of a graph G is the minimum number of vertices whose
deletion disconnects G. A graph with vertex connectivity at least k is said to be k-
connected. By definition, every connected graph is 1-connected. A 2-connected graph is
also called biconnected. A bipolar ordering (also called bipolar numbering) of a graph is
an ordering of its vertices such that every prefix and every suffix of the ordering forms
a connected graph.
3. Maximin Share Fairness
In this section, we consider the fairness guarantees in terms of maximin share fairness.
We assume throughout the section that agents are endowed with additive valuations.
We warm up by showing that for graphs and numbers of agents with the property that
it is always possible to give every agent their G-MMS, the PoC is equal to the best
possible MMS approximation.
Proposition 3.1. Let n be any positive integer, G be any graph, and α := PoC(G,n).
Suppose that for n agents, there always exists a connected allocation that gives each agent
at least their G-MMS. Then, for n agents, there always exists a connected allocation that
gives each agent at least α times their MMS. Moreover, the factor α is tight.
Proof. Assume that n and G satisfy the hypotheses of the proposition. By assumption,
for any n agents, there is a connected allocation that gives each agent at least their
G-MMS. Since PoC(G,n) = α, the same allocation also gives each agent at least α times
their MMS.
We now show that the factor α cannot be improved. Since PoC(G,n) = α, for any
ǫ > 0 there exists a valuation u such that
G-MMS(G,u, n) < (α+ ǫ) ·MMS(u, n).
Consider n agents, each with the valuation u. From the definition of G-MMS, any
connected allocation gives some agent value at most G-MMS(G,u, n). Hence, in any
connected allocation, some agent gets value less than (α+ǫ) ·MMS(u, n). The conclusion
follows.
Prior work has established the existence of a connected allocation that gives every
agent their G-MMS if n = 2 [Lonc and Truszczynski, 2018, Cor. 2] or if G is a tree
[Bouveret et al., 2017, Thm. 5.4]. Proposition 3.1 therefore yields the following:
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Theorem 3.2. Let n be any positive integer, G be any graph, and α := PoC(G,n). If
n = 2, or if G is a tree, then there always exists a connected allocation that gives each
agent at least α times their MMS. Moreover, the factor α is tight in both cases.
The rest of this section is devoted to obtaining bounds on the PoC for arbitrary graphs
in the case of two agents and for paths and stars in the general case. By Theorem 3.2,
this is equivalent to finding the optimal MMS approximation for each of these cases.
3.1. Two Agents
We first focus on the case of two agents. We begin by establishing the PoC for all graphs
with connectivity 1.
Theorem 3.3. Let G be a graph with connectivity exactly 1, and let k ≥ 2 be the
maximum number of connected components that can result from deleting a single vertex
of G. Then PoC(G, 2) = 1/k.
Proof. First, we show that the PoC of G is at most 1/k. Let v be a vertex of G whose
deletion results in k components. Consider a valuation with value k for v, value 1 for
an arbitrary vertex in each of the k components, and value 0 for all other vertices. The
MMS is k. In any connected bipartition, the part that does not contain v is a subset of
one of the k components, so this part has value at most 1. Hence the PoC is at most
1/k.
Next, we show that the PoC of G is at least 1/k. Take an arbitrary valuation u, and
assume without loss of generality that u(M) = 1. Since MMS(u, 2) ≤ u(M)/2 = 1/2,
the desired claim follows if there is a connected bipartition such that both parts have
value at least 1/(2k). Assume that no such bipartition exists.
Pick a spanning tree T of G, and let v be an arbitrary vertex. The removal of v results
in a number of subtrees of T ; clearly, at most one of these subtrees can have value more
than 1/2. If such a subtree exists, we move from v towards the adjacent vertex in that
subtree and repeat the procedure with the new center vertex. Note that we will never
traverse back an edge—otherwise there are two disjoint subtrees with value more than
1/2 each, contradicting u(M) = 1. Since the tree is finite, we eventually reach a vertex
v such that all subtrees T1, . . . , Tr resulting from the removal of v have value at most
1/2 each.
Since Ti and T\Ti are both connected for every i, by our earlier assumption, each
of the subtrees T1, . . . , Tr has value less than 1/(2k). Recall that in the original graph
G, removing v can result in at most k components. This means that if r > k, the r
subtrees must be connected by some edges not belonging to T . If subtrees Ti and Tj
are connected by such an edge, we can merge Ti and Tj into one component. Note that
Ti ∪Tj has value less than 1/(2k)+1/(2k) = 1/k ≤ 1/2, so since Ti∪Tj and T\(Ti ∪Tj)
are both connected, Ti ∪ Tj must again have value less than 1/(2k). Our procedure can
be repeated until the components can no longer be merged, at which point we are left
with at most k components. Each of these components has value less than 1/(2k), which
implies that v has value more than 1−k/(2k) = 1/2. In this case, a bipartition with v as
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one part is a MMS partition, so MMS(u, 2) = 1− u(v). On the other hand, at least one
of the (at most) k components has value at least (1−u(v))/k, which is 1/k of the MMS.
We can take a connected bipartition with such a component as one part and obtain the
desired result.
If a graph admits a bipolar ordering, then since every prefix and every suffix is con-
nected, removing any vertex can result in at most two connected components. For graphs
with connectivity higher than 1 (i.e., removing any vertex keeps the graph connected),
we show later (Theorem 3.7) that the PoC is at least 3/4. Hence we have:
Corollary 3.4. For n = 2, the PoC of a graph that admits a bipolar ordering is at least
1/2.
We remark that the proof of Theorem 3.3 also yields a polynomial-time algorithm for
computing a bipartition such that both parts have value at least 1/k of the MMS. To
compute an allocation between two agents such that both agents receive 1/k of their
MMS, we simply let the first agent compute a desirable bipartition, and let the second
agent choose the part that she prefers. Since MMS(u, 2) ≤ u(M)/2, the second agent is
always satisfied.
Before we move on to results about graphs with higher connectivity, we show the
following lemma, which will help simplify our subsequent proofs. The lemma implies
that in order to prove a lower bound on the PoC in the case of two agents, it suffices to
establish the bound for valuations such that in a MMS partition, the two parts are of
equal value.
Lemma 3.5. For n = 2 and any graph G, the PoC remains the same if instead of taking
the infimum in Definition 2.2
inf
u
G-MMS(G,u, 2)
MMS(u, 2)
over all valuations u, we only take the infimum over all valuations u such that in any
MMS partition according to u, the two parts are of equal value.
Proof. Let u be an arbitrary valuation, and suppose that in a MMS partition, the two
parts are of value x ≤ y. We have MMS(u, 2) = x. Let α := G-MMS(G,u,2)MMS(u,2) . In any
connected bipartition, each part either has value at most αx, or at least (x+ y)− αx =
y + (1− α)x.
Consider a modified valuation u′ where in the MMS partition above, we arbitrarily
decrease the values of some goods in the part with value y so that the part has value x.
It is clear that MMS(u′, 2) = x. With respect to u′, in any connected bipartition, each
part either has value at most αx, or at least y+(1−α)x−(y−x) = (2−α)x. This means
that G-MMS(G,u′, 2) ≤ αx = α ·MMS(u′, 2), or G-MMS(G,u
′,2)
MMS(u′,2) ≤ α. Since the two parts
in any MMS partition according to u′ are of equal value, the proof is complete.
Next, we consider biconnected graphs, i.e., graphs with connectivity at least 2. We
show that the PoC is at least 3/4 for all such graphs. For this result, we will use a
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property of biconnected graphs which we state in the following proposition. An open
ear decomposition of a graph consists of a cycle as the first ear and a sequence of paths
as subsequent ears such that in each path, the first and last vertices belong to previous
ears while the remaining vertices do not.
Proposition 3.6 (Whitney [1932a,b]). In a biconnected graph with at least three vertices,
any two vertices belong to a common cycle, and there exists an open ear decomposition.
Moreover, we may choose any cycle in the graph as the first ear.6
Theorem 3.7. Let G be a biconnected graph. Then PoC(G, 2) ≥ 3/4.
Proof. The case m ≤ 2 is trivial, so consider m ≥ 3. Take an arbitrary valuation u, and
assume without loss of generality that u(M) = 1. By Lemma 3.5, we may also assume
that MMS(u, 2) = 1/2. Call a good heavy if it has value more than 1/4. Since there
can be at most one heavy good in each part of a MMS partition, there are at most two
heavy goods in total. Call these heavy goods g1 and g2; if there are fewer than two heavy
goods, pick the remaining good(s) arbitrarily. By Proposition 3.6, there is a cycle in G
containing g1 and g2, and an open ear decomposition with this cycle as the first ear.
We will construct a bipolar ordering of the vertices that begins with g1 and ends with
g2. Assume that the first ear is a cycle with vertex order g1, h1, . . . , hi, g2, hi+1, . . . , hj .
We arrange these vertices as
g1, h1, h2, . . . , hi, hj , hj−1, . . . , hi+1, g2.
For each subsequent ear, suppose that the two vertices belonging to previous ears are
h and h′, where h appears before h′ in the current ordering. We insert the remaining
vertices on the path from h to h′ into the ordering directly after h, following the same
order as in the path. One can check (for example, by induction on the number of ears)
that the resulting ordering is a bipolar ordering beginning with g1 and ending with g2.
Consider first the case where u(g1) > 1/2 or u(g2) > 1/2; assume without loss of
generality that u(g1) > 1/2. In this case, MMS(u, 2) = 1 − u(g1) < 1/2, contradicting
the assumption that MMS(u, 2) = 1/2.
Assume now that max{u(g1), u(g2)} ≤ 1/2, and recall that u(g) ≤ 1/4 for all g 6∈
{g1, g2}. Since MMS(u, 2) = 1/2, it suffices to find a connected bipartition such that
both parts have value at least 3/8. Let S = {g1}, so u(S) ≤ 1/2. We add one good at
a time to S following the bipolar ordering until u(S) ≥ 1/2. Since u(g2) ≤ 1/2, we stop
(not necessarily directly) before we add g2. Moreover, since each good besides g1 and g2
has value at most 1/4, at some point during this process we must have 3/8 ≤ u(S) ≤ 5/8.
In the bipartition with S as one part, both parts are connected and have value at least
3/8, completing the proof.
Unlike for Theorem 3.3, the proof of Theorem 3.7 does not directly lead to a polynomial-
time algorithm for computing an allocation such that both agents receive 3/4 of their
6There is also a linear-time algorithm for computing an open ear decomposition with an arbitrary cycle
as the first ear [Schmidt, 2013].
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MMS. The problematic step is when we apply Lemma 3.5, since computing the MMS
value is NP-hard by a straightforward reduction from the partition problem. Woeginger
[1997] showed that a PTAS for the problem exists—using his PTAS, we can obtain a
(3/4− ǫ)-approximation algorithm that runs in polynomial time for any constant ǫ > 0.
Nevertheless, we show in Appendix A that by building upon the proof of Theorem 3.7,
we can also achieve a polynomial-time 3/4-approximation algorithm.
In light of Theorems 3.3 and 3.7, it is tempting to believe that for graphs with con-
nectivity 3 or higher, the PoC is strictly greater than 3/4. Perhaps surprisingly, this is
not the case: a counterexample is the wheel graph shown in Figure 1, which has connec-
tivity 3. In the instance shown in the figure, the MMS is 4 while the G-MMS is 3, so
the PoC of the graph is at most 3/4 (and by Theorem 3.7, exactly 3/4). The key point
of this example is that the graph cannot be partitioned into two connected subgraphs
in such a way that one subgraph contains the vertices with value 1 and 3, while the
other subgraph contains the two vertices with value 2. This observation allows us to
generalize the counterexample. A graph is said to be 2-linked if for any two disjoint
pairs of vertices (a, b) and (c, d), there exist two vertex-disjoint paths, one from a to b
and the other from c to d.
3
1
0
0
20
20
0
Figure 1: An instance showing that the PoC of a wheel graph is at most 3/4.
Proposition 3.8. Let G be a graph that is not 2-linked. Then PoC(G, 2) ≤ 3/4.
Proof. Suppose that G is not 2-linked, and let (a, b) and (c, d) be disjoint pairs of vertices
such that there do not exist two disjoint paths, one from a to b and the other from c
to d. Consider a valuation u such that u(a) = 1, u(b) = 3, and u(c) = u(d) = 2.
We have MMS(u, 2) = 4. On the other hand, the graph cannot be partitioned into
two connected subgraphs in such a way that one subgraph contains a and b while the
other subgraph contains c and d—indeed, such a partition would give rise to two disjoint
paths that cannot exist by our assumption. This means that G-MMS(u, 2) = 3. Hence
PoC(G, 2) ≤ 3/4.
All graphs with connectivity at most 2 are not 2-linked,7 and Figure 1 shows an
7Indeed, given such a graph, let a, b be two vertices whose removal disconnects the graph, and let c, d
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example of a 3-connected graph that also does not satisfy the property. In fact, Me´sza´ros
[2015] constructed a 5-connected graph that still fails to be 2-linked!8 Combining these
facts with Theorem 3.7 yields the following corollaries:
Corollary 3.9. Let G be a graph with connectivity 2. We have PoC(G, 2) = 3/4.
Corollary 3.10. There exists a graph G with connectivity 5 such that PoC(G, 2) = 3/4.
While we have not been able to establish a general bound on the PoC for graphs with
connectivity 3 or above, we demonstrate next that ‘almost-complete’ graphs do have PoC
higher than 3/4. In particular, we consider complete graphs with a nonempty matching
removed. These graphs have minimum degree m− 2, where m is the number of vertices
(i.e., goods). We show that the PoC of these graphs is always exactly (2m−5)/(2m−4),
with the only exception being the graph L5 that results from removing two disjoint edges
from the complete graph K5 (Figure 2). The graph L5 is not 2-linked, so Proposition 3.8
(or alternatively, the valuation in Figure 2) implies that its PoC is at most 3/4 instead
of 5/6. In fact, since the graph has connectivity 3, Theorem 3.7 tells us that its PoC is
exactly 3/4.
0
21
23
Figure 2: Graph L5 and a valuation showing that its PoC is at most 3/4.
Theorem 3.11. Let G be a graph that results from removing a nonempty matching from
a complete graph with at least three vertices, and assume that G is different from L5.
Then PoC(G, 2) = (2m− 5)/(2m − 4).
To prove the theorem, we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.12. Let k be a positive integer, 2 ≤ s ≤ 2k be a real number, and let
x1, x2, . . . , xk ≥ 1 be real numbers with sum s. For any real number 0 ≤ r ≤ s − 2,
there exists a subset J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k} such that r ≤
∑
j∈J xj ≤ r + 2.
Proof. We proceed by induction on k. For the base case k = 1 we must have s = 2,
x1 = 2, r = 0, and the result holds trivially. Suppose now that the result holds for k−1;
we will prove it for k. Assume without loss of generality that x1 = max{x1, x2, . . . , xk}.
be vertices from distinct components in the resulting graph. Then any path between c and d must
go through either a or b.
8On the other hand, a 6-connected graph is always 2-linked [Jung, 1970].
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First, assume that x1 ≤ 2. Define yi := x1 + x2 + · · · + xi for each i. The sequence
0, y1, y2, . . . , yk = s is strictly increasing and any two consecutive terms differ by at most
2, so one of the terms x1 + x2 + · · · + xi must be between r and r + 2. Hence we may
take J = {1, 2, . . . , i} to fulfill the claim.
Assume from now on that x1 > 2. We first prove the statement for r ≥ s/2 − 1. If
x1 > s/2 + 1, then since xi ≥ 1 for all i, we have
s = x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xk > (s/2 + 1) + (k − 1) = s/2 + k,
or s > 2k, a contradiction. So x1 ≤ s/2 + 1 ≤ r + 2. If x1 ≥ r, we are done by choosing
J = {1}, so assume that x1 < r.
Let t := x2 + x3 + · · · + xk. Note that 0 ≤ t ≤ s − 2 ≤ 2(k − 1) and 0 < r − x1 ≤
s−2−x1 = t−2. Applying the induction hypothesis on x2, x3, . . . , xk, we find that there
is a set L ⊆ {2, 3, . . . , k} such that r − x1 ≤
∑
l∈L xl ≤ r − x1 + 2. Take J = L ∪ {1}.
We have r ≤
∑
j∈J xj ≤ r + 2, as desired.
Finally, suppose that r < s/2− 1. We have
s− 2 ≥ s− r − 2 > s− (s/2− 1)− 2 = s/2− 1,
so we know from the previous case (r ≥ s/2 − 1) that there exists a subset J ⊆
{1, 2, . . . , k} for which s − r − 2 ≤
∑
j∈J xj ≤ s − r. Since
∑k
j=1 xj = s, it follows
that r ≤
∑
j∈{1,2,...,k}\J xj ≤ r + 2, completing the proof.
We are now ready to establish Theorem 3.11.
Proof of Theorem 3.11. First, we show that the PoC of G is at most (2m−5)/(2m−4).
Let (v1, v2) be a missing edge. Consider a valuation with value m − 2 for each of v1
and v2, value m− 1 for another vertex v3, and value 1 for each of the remaining m− 3
vertices (so the total value is 4m− 8). The MMS is 2m− 4, attained by the bipartition
with {v1, v2} as one part. Take an arbitrary connected bipartition. If v1 and v2 are in
the same part, this part must contain at least one other vertex, so the other part has
value at most 2m − 5. On the other hand, if v1 and v2 are in different parts, the part
that does not contain v3 has value at most 2m− 5. In either case, there is a part with
value no more than 2m − 5, so the G-MMS is at most 2m− 5. It follows that the PoC
is at most (2m− 5)/(2m − 4).
Next, we show that the PoC of G is at least (2m − 5)/(2m − 4). Take an arbitrary
valuation u, and assume without loss of generality that u(M) = 4m−8. By Lemma 3.5,
we may also assume that MMS(u, 2) = (4m − 8)/2 = 2m − 4. It suffices to show that
G-MMS(u, 2) ≥ 2m− 5. Consider any MMS partition. If the partition is connected, we
have that the G-MMS is 2m− 4. Suppose therefore that the partition is not connected.
Since G results from removing a nonempty matching from a complete graph, this means
that (at least) one of the parts corresponds to a missing edge. Let v1 and v2 be the two
vertices in that part (so u({v1, v2}) = 2m− 4), and v3, . . . , vm be the remaining vertices
of G.
Assume first that there exists a vertex v 6∈ {v1, v2} such that u(v) ≤ 1. We have
2m− 4 ≤ u({v1, v2, v}) ≤ 2m− 3, and the vertices v1, v2, v form a connected subgraph.
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Moreover, since the graph G is different from L5, the remaining vertices also form a
connected subgraph; together these vertices have value at least (4m − 8) − (2m − 3) =
2m−5. Hence, in the connected bipartition with {v1, v2, v} as one part, both parts have
value at least 2m− 5. It follows that G-MMS(u, 2) ≥ 2m− 5 in this case.
Assume now that every vertex v 6∈ {v1, v2} satisfies u(v) > 1. If u(v1) ≥ 2m− 5, then
taking the connected bipartition with v1 alone as one part again yields G-MMS(u, 2) ≥
2m − 5; an analogous argument applies if u(v2) ≥ 2m − 5. Suppose therefore that
max{u(v1), u(v2)} < 2m−5. Since u(v1)+u(v2) = 2m−4, we have 1 < u(v1) < 2m−5,
and so 0 < 2m−5−u(v1) < 2m−6. Applying Lemma 3.12 with k = m−2, s = 2m−4,
{x1, . . . , xk} = {u(v3), . . . , u(vm)}, and r = 2m − 5 − u(v1), we find that there exists a
subset of {u(v3), . . . , u(vm)} for which the sum of the elements belongs to the interval
[2m− 5−u(v1), 2m− 3−u(v1)]. Letting S be the set of corresponding goods along with
v1, we have 2m− 5 ≤ u(S) ≤ 2m− 3. Hence, in the connected bipartition with S as one
part, both parts have value at least 2m − 5. Therefore G-MMS(u, 2) ≥ 2m − 5 in this
case as well, and the proof is complete.
3.2. Any Number of Agents
We move on to the general setting where the goods are divided among an arbitrary
number of agents. In this setting, it is no longer true that the PoC precisely captures
the MMS approximation that can be guaranteed to the agents—this is evident in the
case of a complete graph, where the MMS is 1 by definition, but an allocation that gives
all agents their full MMS does not always exist [Kurokawa et al., 2018]. At first glance, it
may seem conceivable that certain graphs do not admit any useful MMS approximation.
However, we provide a non-trivial guarantee for arbitrary graphs that depends only on
the number of agents and goods (Theorem 3.14). We begin by establishing a general
lower bound on the PoC.
Theorem 3.13. For any graph G and any number of agents n, we have PoC(G,n) ≥
1/(m− n+ 1).
Proof. If m < n, the PoC is 1. Assume that m ≥ n, and consider an arbitrary valuation
u. Let (M1, . . . ,Mn) be a (not necessarily connected) partition of M that maximizes
mini=1,...,n u(Mi). We assume without loss of generality that |Mi| ≥ 1 for each i, which
also means that |Mi| ≤ m− n+ 1 for every i.
For each i, let gi be a good of highest value in Mi according to u, and let M
′
i = {gi}.
As long as ∪ni=1M
′
i 6= M , we add a good not already in ∪
n
i=1M
′
i to one of the bundles
M ′i so that the bundle remains connected; this is always possible since G is connected.
At the end of this process, (M ′1, . . . ,M
′
n) is a connected partition of M . By our choice
of gi, we have
u(M ′i) ≥
1
m− n+ 1
· u(Mi)
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for every i. It follows that
MMS(G,u, n) ≥ min
i=1,...,n
u(M ′i)
≥
1
m− n+ 1
· min
i=1,...,n
u(Mi)
=
1
m− n+ 1
·MMS(u, n).
Hence PoC(G,n) ≥ 1/(m− n+ 1).
As we will see in Theorems 3.16 and 3.19, the bound 1/(m−n+1) is tight for sufficiently
short paths and all stars. We now give a maximin share guarantee for arbitrary graphs.
Theorem 3.14. For any graph G and any number of agents n, there exists a connected
allocation that gives each agent at least 1/(m− n+ 1) of their MMS.
Proof. Take an arbitrary spanning tree H of G. By Theorem 3.13, PoC(H,n) ≥ 1/(m−
n+1). By Theorem 3.2, there exists a connected allocation with respect to H that gives
each agent at least 1/(m−n+1) times their MMS. Since any connected allocation with
respect to H is also connected with respect to G, the conclusion follows.
Next, we derive tight bounds on the PoC in the cases of paths and stars for any
number of agents. By Theorem 3.2, this is equivalent to finding the optimal MMS
approximation for each of these cases. The following simple fact about MMS will be
useful for our proofs.
Lemma 3.15. Let m ≥ n, and let M ′ ⊆ M be an arbitrary set of at least m − n + 1
goods. For an agent with valuation u, we have u(M ′) ≥ MMS(u, n).
Proof. Observe that in any partition of the vertices into n parts, at least one of the
parts is contained in M ′. In particular, this holds for a MMS partition. It follows that
MMS(u, n) ≤ u(M ′), as claimed.
Theorem 3.16. Let n ≥ 2 and let G be a star. Then
PoC(G,n) =
{
1
m−n+1 if m ≥ n;
1 if m < n.
Proof. If m < n the PoC is 1, so assume that m ≥ n. We first show that the PoC is at
most 1/(m− n+ 1). Consider a valuation u with value m− n+ 1 for the center vertex
and for n− 2 of the leaves, and value 1 for each of the remaining m− n+ 1 leaves. We
have MMS(u, n) = m − n + 1. In any connected partition into n parts, at least n − 1
parts contain a single leaf. This means that at least one of these parts contains a single
leaf with value 1. Hence the PoC is at most 1/(m− n+ 1).
Next, we show that the PoC is at least 1/(m− n+1). Take an arbitrary valuation u,
let v∗ be the center vertex, and let v1, v2, . . . , vn−1 be the leaves with the highest value
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where u(v1) ≥ · · · ≥ u(vn−1). Consider a connected partition Π with each of these n− 1
vertices as a part, and the remaining m− n+ 1 vertices as the last part.
Let A := M\{v∗, v1, . . . , vn−2}. By Lemma 3.15, MMS(u, n) ≤ u(A). Since there are
m− n+ 1 vertices in A and vn−1 is a vertex with the highest value, we have
u(vn−1) ≥
1
m− n+ 1
· u(A) ≥
1
m− n+ 1
·MMS(u, n).
It follows that u(vi) ≥ MMS(u, n)/(m − n + 1) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, so the first
n − 1 parts of Π have value at least MMS(u, n)/(m − n + 1) each. The last part of Π
is B := M\{v1, v2, . . . , vn−1}. By Lemma 3.15 again, we have MMS(u, n) ≤ u(B). This
means that all parts of Π have value at least MMS(u, n)/(m − n+ 1), as desired.
The proof of Theorem 3.16 also gives rise to a polynomial-time algorithm for comput-
ing a connected allocation for n agents on a star such that each agent receives at least
1/(m− n+ 1) of their MMS: Let each of the first n− 1 agents pick a favorite leaf from
the remaining leaves in turn, and let the last agent take the remaining m−n+1 vertices.
We now address the case of paths. First, we introduce an approximation of propor-
tionality that may be of independent interest. Recall that an allocation is said to be
proportional if it gives every agent at least their proportional share, which is defined as
u(M)/n. Even though a proportional allocation always exists for divisible goods, as we
explained in the introduction, this is not the case for indivisible goods. Our definition
adapts proportionality to the setting of indivisible goods.
Definition 3.17. For positive integers n,m, define
IPS(n,m) =


1
n
if m ≥ 2n− 1;
1
m−n+1 if n ≤ m < 2n− 1;
0 if m < n.
Given n agents and m goods, a bundle A is said to satisfy the indivisible proportional
share (IPS) property for an agent with valuation u if there exists a (possibly empty) set
B ⊆M\A with |B| ≤ n− 1 such that
u(A) ≥ IPS(n,m) · u(M\B).
An allocation is said to satisfy the IPS property if every agent receives a bundle that
satisfies the IPS property. For brevity, we will refer to a bundle or allocation that satisfies
the IPS property as being IPS.
We remark that IPS is a stronger property than the property PROP∗(n − 1) consid-
ered by Segal-Halevi and Suksompong [2018], which corresponds to taking IPS(n,m) =
1/n for m ≥ n and 0 for m < n. It is also stronger than PROP1 considered by
Conitzer et al. [2017] and Aziz et al. [2019], as well as a proportionality relaxation stud-
ied by Suksompong [2019]. Despite its strength, we show that an IPS allocation always
exists. Moreover, we can obtain a connected IPS allocation if the graph is a path.
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Proposition 3.18. Let n ≥ 2 and let G be a path. There exists a connected IPS
allocation of the m goods to the n agents.
Proof. If m < n, each agent needs utility 0 in an IPS allocation, so the claim holds
trivially. Assume that m ≥ n. Starting with an empty bundle, we process the goods
along the path (say, from left to right) and add them one at a time to the current bundle
until the bundle is IPS to at least one of the agents. We then allocate the bundle to
one such agent, and repeat the procedure with the remaining goods and agents. Any
leftover goods are allocated to the agent who receives the last bundle.
We claim that this procedure always results in an IPS allocation. Notice from Defi-
nition 3.17 that if a bundle is IPS for an agent, then so is any superset of the bundle.
Hence it suffices to show that after n− 1 bundles are allocated, the last agent still finds
the remaining bundle to be IPS. Assume without loss of generality that the bundles are
allocated to agents 1, 2, . . . , n in this order, and let u be the valuation of agent n. The
claim holds trivially if the empty bundle is IPS for agent n, so assume that it is not. For
1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, let the bundle allocated to agent i be Mi = Xi ∪ Yi, where Yi consists of
the last good added to Mi (if Mi is nonempty), and Xi consists of the remaining goods.
Let X = ∪n−1i=1Xi and Y = ∪
n−1
i=1 Yi. In particular, |Y | ≤ n− 1.
Let Mn be the bundle allocated to agent n. We consider two cases.
• Case 1: m ≥ 2n − 1. By definition of the procedure, agent n does not find any
of the bundles X1, . . . ,Xn−1 to be IPS. In particular, noting that Y ⊆ M\Xi
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and taking B = Y in Definition 3.17, we have u(Xi) <
IPS(n,m) · u(M\Y ) = u(M\Y )/n for all i. Hence,
u(Mn) = u(M)−
n−1∑
i=1
u(Xi)−
n−1∑
i=1
u(Yi)
> u(M)−
n− 1
n
· u(M\Y )− u(Y )
=
1
n
· u(M\Y ).
Since Y ⊆M\Mn, bundle Mn is IPS for agent n.
• Case 2: n ≤ m ≤ 2n−1. First, we show that at most m−n of the first n−1 agents
can receive at least two goods. Assume for contradiction that at least m − n + 1
of these agents receive at least two goods, and suppose that the first m − n + 1
of them are agents a1, . . . , am−n+1 in this order. Let j be the first good in agent
am−n+1’s bundle. We claim that the bundle consisting of good j alone is IPS for
agent n; this is sufficient for the desired contradiction because agent n should have
taken this bundle ahead of agent am−n+1.
Before agent am−n+1 receives her bundle, the goods in X allocated to earlier agents
are precisely those in the set X ′ := ∪m−ni=1 Xai . Let Z = M\(X
′ ∪ {j}). Since
|X ′| ≥ m − n, we have |Z| ≤ m − (m − n) − 1 = n − 1. By definition of the
procedure, agent n does not find any of the bundles Xa1 , . . . ,Xam−n to be IPS. In
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particular, noting that Z ⊆M\Xai and taking B = Z in Definition 3.17, we have
u(Xai) < u(M\Z)/(m− n+ 1) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m− n. Hence,
u({j}) = u(M)− u(X ′)− u(Z)
= u(M\Z)−
m−n∑
i=1
u (Xai)
> u(M\Z)−
m− n
m− n+ 1
· u(M\Z) =
1
m− n+ 1
· u(M\Z).
Since Z ⊆ M\{j}, bundle {j} is IPS for agent n, so agent n should indeed have
taken this bundle ahead of agent am−n+1. This contradiction means that at most
m− n of the first n− 1 agents can receive at least two goods.
We now proceed in a similar way as in Case 1. By definition of the procedure,
agent n does not find any of the bundles X1, . . . ,Xn−1 to be IPS. In particular,
noting that Y ⊆M\Xi for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1 and taking B = Y in Definition 3.17,
we have u(Xi) < IPS(n,m) · u(M\Y ) = u(M\Y )/(m− n+ 1) for all i. Hence,
u(Mn) = u(M)−
n−1∑
i=1
u(Xi)−
n−1∑
i=1
u(Yi)
> u(M)−
m− n
m− n+ 1
· u(M\Y )− u(Y )
=
1
m− n+ 1
· u(M\Y ),
where the inequality holds because at most m − n of the sets Xi are nonempty.
Since Y ⊆M\Mn, bundle Mn is IPS for agent n.
The two cases together complete the proof.
Proposition 3.18 allows us to establish the PoC for paths, which we do next in The-
orem 3.19. Conversely, the instances that we use to show the upper bound on the
PoC in Theorem 3.19 also show that the factor IPS(n,m) in the existence guarantee of
Proposition 3.18 cannot be improved.
Theorem 3.19. Let n ≥ 2 and let G be a path. Then
PoC(G,n) =


1
n
if m ≥ 2n− 1;
1
m−n+1 if n ≤ m < 2n− 1;
1 if m < n.
Proof. If m < n the PoC is 1, so assume that m ≥ n. We will show that PoC(G,n) =
IPS(n,m).
First, we show that PoC(G,n) ≥ IPS(n,m). Take an arbitrary valuation u. Applying
Proposition 3.18 to n agents who have the same valuation u, we find that there exists a
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connected IPS allocation. This means each agent i receives a bundle Mi for which there
exists a set Bi ⊆M\Mi with |Bi| ≤ n−1 such that u(Mi) ≥ IPS(n,m) ·u(M\Bi). Since
|M\Bi| ≥ m − n + 1, Lemma 3.15 implies that u(M\Bi) ≥ MMS(u, n). Consequently,
we have
u(Mi) ≥ IPS(n,m) · u(M\Bi) ≥ IPS(n,m) ·MMS(u, n)
for all agents i. Hence (M1, . . . ,Mn) is a connected partition with each part having value
at least IPS(n,m) ·MMS(u, n). It follows that PoC(G,n) ≥ IPS(n,m).
Next, we show that PoC(G,n) ≤ IPS(n,m). We consider two cases.
• Case 1: m ≥ 2n− 1. Consider a valuation u with value 1, n, 1, . . . , n, 1 for the first
2n−1 vertices on the path (so exactly n vertices have value 1), and value 0 for the
remaining vertices. We have MMS(u, n) = n. On the other hand, one can check
that in any connected partition into n parts, at least one of the parts has value at
most 1. Hence the PoC is at most 1/n = IPS(n,m).
• Case 2: n ≤ m < 2n−1. Consider a valuation u with value 1,m−n+1, 1, . . . ,m−
n+ 1, 1 for the first 2m− 2n+ 1 vertices on the path (so m− n+ 1 vertices have
value 1 while m− n vertices have value m− n + 1), and value m− n + 1 for the
remaining 2n− 1−m vertices. In total, n− 1 vertices have value m− n+ 1, and
m− n+ 1 vertices have value 1. We have MMS(u, n) = m− n+ 1. On the other
hand, one can check that in any connected partition into n parts, at least one of
the parts has value at most 1. Hence the PoC is at most 1/(m−n+1) = IPS(n,m).
In both cases we have PoC(G,n) ≤ IPS(n,m), completing the proof.
In order to compute a connected allocation for n agents on a path such that every agent
receives at least PoC(G,n) of their MMS, we can use the algorithm in Proposition 3.18,
which runs in polynomial time, to compute a connected IPS allocation. The first part
in the proof of Theorem 3.19 implies that this allocation fulfills the desired guarantee.
4. Relaxations of Envy-Freeness
In this section, we consider relaxations of envy-freeness. Unless specified otherwise, we
allow agents to have arbitrary monotonic valuations. We say that a graph G guarantees
EFk for n agents if for all permitted valuations of the n agents, there exists a connected
EFk allocation.
4.1. Two Agents
For two agents, Bilo` et al. [2019] characterized the set of graphs that always admit an
EF1 allocation regardless of the agents’ valuations. Their characterization is based on
the observation that such graphs necessarily admit a vertex ordering to which a discrete
variant of the cut-and-choose protocol can be applied—in other words, the ordering is
bipolar. The family of graphs that admit a bipolar ordering can be characterized using
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the block decomposition of a graph. A block is a maximal biconnected subgraph of a
graph, and a cut vertex is a vertex whose removal increases the number of connected
components in the graph. The block decomposition of a graph G is a bipartite graph
B(G) with all blocks of G on one side and all cut vertices of G on the other side; there is
an edge between a block and a cut vertex in B(G) if and only if the cut vertex belongs
to the block in G.9
Proposition 4.1 (Bondy and Murty [2008]). For any connected graph G, each pair of
blocks share no edge and at most one cut vertex, and the block decomposition B(G) is a
tree.
Bilo` et al. [2019] showed that a connected graph G guarantees EF1 for two agents if
and only if a bipolar ordering exists in G, i.e., the blocks of G can be arranged into a
path.
Proposition 4.2 (Bilo` et al. [2019]). For any connected graph G, the following four
conditions are equivalent:10
(1) The block decomposition B(G) is a path;
(2) G admits a bipolar ordering;
(3) G guarantees EF1 for two agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations;
(4) G guarantees EF1 for two agents with identical binary valuations.
Bilo` et al. [2019]’s characterization allows us to identify graphs for which an EF1 allo-
cation always exists in the case of two agents. However, for the remaining graphs, it does
not provide any fairness guarantee. Our next result generalizes their characterization
by giving the best possible EFk guarantee that can be made for each specific graph. In
particular, we will show that a graph G guarantees EFk for two agents if and only if G
admits a bipolar ordering over a subset of the vertices where each vertex in the ordering
has at most k − 1 vertices ‘hanging’ from it.
To formalize this idea, it will be useful to define the following notions. Given a path
P in the block graph B(G) of a graph G, for any vertex v of G that is not contained in
any block in P , we define its guardian to be the cut vertex v′ closest to v in B(G) that
belongs to some block in P (see Figure 3 for an example); we say that v is a dependent
of v′. For a given graph, we define a merge on a subset V of vertices forming a connected
subgraph to be an operation where we replace the vertices in V by a single vertex v,
and there is an edge between v and another vertex w in the new graph exactly when w
is adjacent to at least one vertex of V in the original graph. A path in a tree is said to
be maximal if each of its end vertices is a leaf of the tree.
9We refer to Bilo` et al. [2019] for examples of graphs and their block decompositions.
10Bilo` et al. [2019] used a slightly stronger definition of EF1 that they called “envy-freeness up to one
outer good”. In their definition, one is only allowed to remove a good if doing so leaves the remaining
bundle connected. It can be verified that their result also holds for the standard definition of EF1.
20
v1
v2 v3
v4 v5
v6 v7
P
Figure 3: An example of a block decomposition B(G) in the proof of Theorem 4.3. Blue vertices
correspond to blocks in G and red vertices correspond to cut vertices in G. Here,
C(P ) = {v1, v3, v6, v7}. In this example, v1 is the guardian of all vertices in block v2
except itself, v3 is the guardian of all vertices in blocks v4 and v5 except itself, while
v6 and v7 are not guardians of any vertices.
Theorem 4.3. For any connected graph G and positive integer k, the following four
conditions are equivalent:
(1) There exists a path P in the block decomposition B(G) such that each cut vertex
that belongs to some block in P has at most k − 1 dependents;
(2) The vertices of G can be partitioned into disjoint subsets V1, . . . , Vr such that each
Vj forms a connected subgraph of size at most k in G, and if we merge the vertices
in every set Vj separately, the resulting graph admits a bipolar ordering;
(3) G guarantees EFk for two agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations;
(4) G guarantees EFk for two agents with identical binary valuations.
Proof. Consider the block decomposition B(G), and recall from Proposition 4.1 that
B(G) is a tree. For each path P of B(G), we denote by C(P ) the set of cut vertices that
belong to some block in P .
To show (1) ⇒ (2), suppose that there exists a path P in the block decomposition
B(G) such that each cut vertex in C(P ) has at most k − 1 dependents. Take each
set Vj in the theorem statement to consist of a vertex in C(P ) along with all of its
dependents. Clearly, at most k vertices belong to each Vj. Also, each Vj is connected
since the vertices in Vj form a connected subgraph of the block decomposition. Let
G′ be the graph resulting from the merge operations on each Vj separately. The block
decomposition of G′ is a path, and hence G′ admits a bipolar ordering by Proposition 4.2.
To show (2) ⇒ (3), suppose that the vertices of G can be partitioned into disjoint
subsets V1, . . . , Vr as defined in the statement of the theorem. We will show that G
guarantees EFk for two agents. Consider arbitrary monotonic valuations of the two
agents ui for i = 1, 2. Let G
′ be the graph resulting from the merge operations on each
Vj for j = 1, . . . , r. We define the valuations u
′
i on G
′ for i = 1, 2, where the value of an
agent for each bundle M ′ is equal to her value for all vertices of G that are merged into
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the vertices of M ′. Specifically, for each i = 1, 2 and each bundle M ′ in G′,
u′i(M
′) = ui

 ⋃
Vj∈M ′
Vj

 .
Note that each u′i remains monotonic and, by our assumption, G
′ admits a bipolar
ordering. Thus, by Proposition 4.2, G′ admits a connected EF1 allocation (M ′1,M
′
2)
with the valuations u′i, so an agent’s envy can be eliminated by removing a vertex of
G′ from the other agent’s bundle. Consider the corresponding allocation (M1,M2) of
G, where Mi =
⋃
Vj∈M ′i
Vj for i = 1, 2. Since each vertex of G
′ is a merge of at most
k vertices, any envy that results from this allocation can be eliminated by removing at
most k vertices, and so the allocation (M1,M2) is a connected EFk allocation of G.
The implication (3) ⇒ (4) is immediate. To show (4) ⇒ (1), suppose that for every
path P of B(G), there exists some cut vertex in C(P ) with at least k dependents. We
will show that there exist identical binary valuations for which the graph G does not
admit an EFk allocation.
Let k∗ ≥ 1 be the smallest number for which there exists a maximal path P in B(G)
such that each cut vertex in C(P ) is the guardian of at most k∗−1 vertices in G. Choose
a maximal path P in B(G) where each cut vertex in C(P ) has at most k∗−1 dependents;
if several such paths exist, choose one that minimizes the number of vertices in C(P )
with exactly k∗ − 1 dependents. By definition of k∗, we have k∗ − 1 ≥ k. Hence it
suffices to show the existence of identical binary valuations for which the graph G does
not admit an EF(k∗ − 1) allocation.
Let v ∈ C(P ) be a cut vertex with k∗−1 dependents. It could be that v is on the path
P itself (e.g., vertices v1, v6, and v7 in Figure 3), or v is not on the path P but belongs
to some block in P (e.g., vertex v3 in Figure 3). We consider the two cases separately.
• Case 1: v is in the path P itself. Let Lv and Rv be the subtree of the tree B(G)
rooted at v starting with each of the two blocks adjacent to v on the path P ,
respectively. For each subtree besides Lv and Rv of the tree B(G) rooted at v,
with a block adjacent to v in B(G) as the root of the subtree, define its size to be
the number of dependents of v in G belonging to at least one block in the subtree.
Note that the size can be different from the number of vertices in the subtree in
B(G).
Suppose that T is a largest subtree among such subtrees and has size r ≤ k∗ − 1.
We claim that at least r vertices of G (excluding v) belong to some block in Lv.
Assume for contradiction that there are at most r − 1 such vertices. In B(G), we
switch Lv with T and choose an arbitrary path of T that contains a leaf of B(G)
to be on the main path P (see Figure 4). Let P ′ denote the new maximal path.
Since v loses at least r dependents and gains at most r− 1 new dependents, v now
has at most k∗ − 2 dependents with respect to P ′. Moreover, since T has size at
most k∗ − 1, each of the new cut vertices in C(P ′) has at most k∗ − 2 dependents.
Hence we have decreased the number of cut vertices with k∗ − 1 dependents by at
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Lv
T
Rv
v
P ′
Lv
T
Rv
v
Figure 4: An example of a switch operation on the tree B(G) in Case 1 of the proof of The-
orem 4.3. The top and bottom figures are the trees before and after the operation,
respectively.
least 1. This gives the desired contradiction. The same argument shows that at
least r vertices of G (excluding v) belong to some block in Rv.
Consider two agents who have the same binary valuation with value 1 for v, its
k∗ − 1 dependents, r arbitrary vertices of G (besides v) belonging to some block
in Lv, and r arbitrary vertices of G (besides v) belonging to some block in Rv,
and value 0 for the remaining vertices. The total value of an agent is 2r + k∗. In
any connected allocation, one of the agents does not receive v. This agent receives
value at most r, while the remaining goods are worth at least r + k∗. It follows
that the allocation cannot be EF(k∗ − 1).
• Case 2: v is not in the path P but belongs to some block B in P . Let LB and
RB be the subtree of the tree B(G) rooted at B starting with each of the two
cut vertices adjacent to B on the path P , respectively. We claim that at least k∗
vertices of G belong to some block in LB . Assume for contradiction that there are
at most k∗ − 1 such vertices. Let v′ be the cut vertex in LB adjacent to B. In
B(G), we switch LB with v and its dependents, and choose an arbitrary path P
′
that starts with v and contains at least one of its dependents as well as a leaf of
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P ′
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Bv′
P ′′
P ′
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RB
v B
v′
Figure 5: An example of a switch operation on the tree B(G) in Case 2 of the proof of The-
orem 4.3. The top and bottom figures are the trees before and after the operation,
respectively.
B(G) to be on the main path P (see Figure 5). Let P ′′ denote the new maximal
path. Since LB contains at most k
∗ − 1 vertices (which include v′), v′ now has at
most k∗ − 2 dependents with respect to P ′′. Moreover, the subtree that replaced
LB has at most k
∗ vertices. Among these vertices, v and at least one other vertex
belong to P ′, which is now on the new path P ′′, so any new cut vertex has at
most k∗− 2 dependents. Hence we have decreased the number of cut vertices with
k∗ − 1 dependents by at least 1. This gives the desired contradiction. The same
argument shows that at least k∗ vertices of G belong to some block in RB.
Consider two agents who have the same binary valuation with value 1 for v, its
k∗ − 1 dependents, k∗ arbitrary vertices of G belonging to some block in LB,
and k∗ arbitrary vertices of G belonging to some block in RB, and value 0 for the
remaining vertices. The total value of an agent is 3k∗. In any connected allocation,
one of the agents receives a bundle whose vertices of value 1 are contained in LB,
RB , or the set with v and its dependents. This agent receives value at most k
∗,
while the remaining goods are worth at least 2k∗. It follows that the allocation
cannot be EF(k∗ − 1).
Hence, in both cases there exist identical binary valuations for which the graph does not
admit an EF(k∗ − 1) allocation, as claimed.
Theorem 4.3 allows us to determine in polynomial time the optimal k such that a given
graph always admits an EFk allocation, as well as to compute such an allocation. To do
so, we compute the block decomposition B(G) of the graph—this can be done in linear
time [Hopcroft and Tarjan, 1973]. We then determine the value of k∗ in the proof of the
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theorem, which we have shown to be equal to the optimal value of k; this can be done
by testing all pairs of vertices as endpoints of the path P . Finally, we compute a bipolar
ordering of the vertices belonging to P—again, this takes linear time [Even and Tarjan,
1976]—and apply the EF1 algorithm of Bilo` et al. [2019] on the merged vertices.
Theorem 4.3 also yields a short proof that every graph admits an EF(m−2) allocation.
Moreover, we show that the bound m− 2 is tight for stars.
Proposition 4.4. Let n = 2, and let G be any graph with at least three vertices. There
exists a connected EF(m− 2) allocation to the two agents.
Proof. Since the graph contains at least three vertices, it has a path of length 2; let the
three vertices on this path be v1, v2, v3. Let V1 = {v1}, V2 = {v2}, V3 = {v3}. We add the
remaining vertices to these sets arbitrarily so that each set remains connected. Clearly,
each set contains at most m− 2 vertices. Theorem 4.3 then implies that an EF(m− 2)
allocation exists.
Proposition 4.5. Let n = 2, and let G be a star with at least two edges. There exist
identical binary valuations of the two agents such that a connected EF(m− 3) allocation
does not exist.
Proof. Consider two agents who have value 1 for every good. In any connected allocation,
one of the agents receives at most one good, while the other agent receives at least m−1
goods. Hence the allocation cannot be EF(m− 3).
Next, we consider a stronger fairness notion, EFX. It is known that for two agents with
arbitrary monotonic valuations, an EFX allocation always exists [Plaut and Roughgarden,
2018]. We show that if we consider connected allocations, the statement remains true
only if the graph is complete.
Theorem 4.6. Let n = 2, and let G be a non-complete graph. There exist identical
additive valuations of the two agents such that no connected allocation is EFX.
Proof. Pick an arbitrary missing edge of G, and let ǫ > 0 be a sufficiently small constant.
Suppose that the two agents have value 2 for each of the two vertices with a missing
edge (call them v1 and v2), and value 3, ǫ, ǫ, . . . , ǫ for the remaining vertices (call the first
vertex v3). Assume for contradiction that there exists a connected EFX allocation. In
this allocation, neither of the agents can receive v3 together with one (or both) of v1, v2.
So one of the agents must receive v1 and v2, while the other agent receives v3. If the
first agent also receives one of the remaining vertices, the allocation cannot be EFX. So
the second agent receives all of the remaining vertices. However, the resulting allocation
is not connected, a contradiction.
4.2. Three Agents
We now move on to the case of three agents. Bilo` et al. [2019] showed that in this case,
an EF1 allocation is guaranteed to exist if the graph contains a Hamiltonian path11 or
11Clearly, it suffices to prove the claim when the graph is a path.
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if it is a star with three edges. We extend this result by characterizing all trees and
complete bipartite graphs that always admit an EF1 allocation.
Theorem 4.7. Let n = 3, and let G be a tree. Then G admits a connected EF1 allocation
for three agents with arbitrary valuations if and only if G is either a path, or a star with
three edges.
Proof. The ‘if’ direction was already shown by Bilo` et al. [2019]; we establish the ‘only
if’ direction. Assume that G is neither a path, nor a star with three edges. Suppose first
that there is a vertex v with degree at least 4. Consider three agents who have identical
valuations with value 1 on v and four of its neighbors, and 0 on all other vertices. In
any connected allocation, an agent who does not get v receives value at most 1, while
the bundle of the agent who gets v has value at least 3 to her. Hence the allocation is
not EF1.
Suppose now that every vertex has degree at most 3. Since G is not a path, there
is a vertex v with degree 3. Moreover, since G is not a star, one of the branches from
v contains at least two vertices, say a branch starting with a neighbor v1 of v followed
by another vertex v2. Let v3, v4 be the two other vertices adjacent to v. Consider three
agents who have identical valuations with value 2 for v, v3, v4, value 3 for v1, value 4 for
v2, and value 0 for all other vertices (see Figure 6). Consider any connected allocation;
in what follows, we will only be concerned with goods of non-zero value. First, assume
that one of the agents receives either only v3 or only v4, and obtains value at most 2. If
another agent receives at least three goods, the allocation is clearly not EF1. So each
of the other two agents receives exactly two goods, which means one of them receives v1
and v2. This bundle is worth 3 to the first agent even after removing the most valuable
good, so the allocation cannot be EF1. Hence one of the agents receives v3, v4, and v.
But then the agent who does not receive v2 will envy this agent even after removing one
good.
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Figure 6: Example of an instance in the proof of Theorem 4.7
Next, we consider complete bipartite graphs. Denote by Ka,b the complete bipartite
graph with a vertices on the left (call this set of vertices L) and b vertices on the right
(call this set of vertices R). We start by showing that if a, b ≥ 3, there always exists
a connected allocation. In fact, we state and prove a generalization that holds for any
number of agents.
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Proposition 4.8. Let n ≥ 2, and let G be a complete bipartite graph Ka,b with a, b ≥ n.
Then G always admits a connected EF1 allocation.
Proof. We enhance the envy cycle elimination algorithm of Lipton et al. [2004], which
computes an EF1 allocation for any number of agents. The algorithm works by allocating
one good at a time in arbitrary order—we will exploit this freedom in choosing the order.
It also maintains an envy graph, which has the agents as its vertices, and a directed edge
i → j if agent i envies agent j with respect to the current (partial) allocation. At each
step, the next good is allocated to an agent with no incoming edge, and any cycle that
arises as a result is eliminated by giving j’s bundle to i for each edge i→ j in the cycle.
This allows the algorithm to maintain the invariant that the envy graph is cycle-free,
and so there exists an agent with no incoming edge before each allocation of a good.
We apply the envy cycle elimination algorithm by choosing a careful order of the goods
to allocate. Since a ≥ n and every agent is unenvied at the beginning, we can first pick
n goods from L and allocate one of them to each agent. After this point, we may no
longer have control over which agent to choose next. Take an agent with no incoming
edge in the envy graph. If the agent has already received a good from R, allocate to her
a good from L if one still remains, otherwise allocate a good from R. Else, the agent
has not received a good from R. In this case, allocate to her a good from R if one still
remains, otherwise allocate a good from L. The pseudocode is presented as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Enhanced Envy Cycle Elimination Algorithm
1: procedure EnhancedEnvyCycleElimination(N,L,R, u1, . . . , un)
2: M1, . . . ,Mn ← ∅
3: r1, . . . , rn ← false
4: for i ∈ N do
5: Move an arbitrary good from L to Mi.
6: while L ∪R 6= ∅ do
7: Update the envy graph.
8: i← any agent with no incoming edge in the envy graph
9: if ri = true then
10: if L 6= ∅ then
11: Move an arbitrary good from L to Mi.
12: else
13: Move an arbitrary good from R to Mi.
14: else
15: if R 6= ∅ then
16: Move an arbitrary good from R to Mi.
17: ri ← true
18: else
19: Move an arbitrary good from L to Mi.
20: return (M1, . . . ,Mn)
The resulting allocation is EF1 [Lipton et al., 2004]; we now show that it is connected.
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Every agent receives a good from L in the first phase of the algorithm. Note that if an
agent receives at least one good from both L and R, her bundle is guaranteed to be
connected. So it suffices to show that an agent will never receive more than one good
from L without receiving a good from R. By construction, an agent who already has
a good from R will take goods from L unless L is already empty. Since b ≥ n, this
means that as long as some agent has not received a good from R and the algorithm
has not terminated, there is at least one good from R left. This establishes the desired
claim.
Since the envy cycle elimination algorithm runs in time polynomial in the number of
agents and goods [Lipton et al., 2004], the proof of Theorem 4.9 also yields a polynomial-
time algorithm that computes a connected EF1 allocation for any number of agents. If
the agents have additive valuations, we can also obtain an EF1 allocation via a “double
round-robin algorithm”—the details can be found in Appendix B.
With Proposition 4.8 in hand, we can now proceed with the characterization for com-
plete bipartite graphs.
Theorem 4.9. Let n = 3, and let a, b be positive integers with a ≤ b. The graph Ka,b
always admit a connected EF1 allocation if and only if one of the following holds:
1. a = 1 and b ≤ 3;
2. a = 2 and b ≤ 3;
3. a, b ≥ 3.
Proof. The case a = 1 is covered by Theorem 4.7 and the case a ≥ 3 by Proposition 4.8,
so assume that a = 2. If b ≤ 3, then G contains a Hamiltonian path, so the existence of
an EF1 allocation follows from the result of Bilo` et al. [2019]. Else, let b ≥ 4. Consider
three agents who have identical valuations with value 2 on each of the two vertices
v1, v2 ∈ L, value 1 on four of the vertices v3, v4, v5, v6 ∈ R, and value 0 for the remaining
vertices. Consider any connected allocation. If v1 and v2 are allocated to the same
agent, this agent must also receive at least one of the vertices from R, and the allocation
is not EF1. Else, one agent receives v1 and another agent receives v2. Now, the third
agent can get at most one vertex from R and therefore receives value at most 1. This
means that one of the first two agents receives one of v1 and v2 along with at least two
of v3, v4, v5, v6. This agent is envied by the third agent even after we remove a good. It
follows that the allocation cannot be EF1.
5. Discussion
In this paper, we study the fair allocation of indivisible goods under connectivity con-
straints, and present an extensive set of results on the guarantees that can be achieved us-
ing maximin share fairness and relaxations of envy-freeness for various classes of graphs.
For maximin share fairness, we establish a link between the graph-specific maximin share
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Figure 7: Example of an instance in the proof of Theorem 4.9
and the well-studied maximin share through our price of connectivity notion. We pro-
vide a number of bounds on the price of connectivity, several of which are tight. On the
envy-freeness front, we classify all connected graphs based on the strongest relaxation
with guaranteed existence in the case of two agents, and characterize the set of trees and
complete bipartite graphs that always admit an EF1 allocation for three agents. Ex-
tending our results beyond three agents is a challenging problem: even when the graph
is a path, the only known proof of EF1 existence for four agents employs arguments
based on Sperner’s lemma, and the corresponding question remains open when there are
at least five agents [Bilo` et al., 2019].
Our results on envy-freeness relaxations hold for agents with arbitrary monotonic valu-
ations. On the other hand, as is the case in most of the literature, our results on maximin
share fairness rely on the assumption that the agents’ valuations are additive. Maximin
share fairness beyond additive valuations has been studied by Barman and Krishna Murthy
[2017] and Ghodsi et al. [2018]; for example, they showed that a constant approxima-
tion of the maximin share can be achieved for any number of agents with submodular
valuations when the graph is complete. Since complementarity and substitutability are
common in practice, it would be interesting to see how the graph-based approximations
that we obtain in this paper change as we enlarge the class of valuations considered.
Indeed, as Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] noted, there is a rich landscape of problems
to explore in fair division with different classes of valuations, and our graph setting is
likely to be no exception.
Finally, while our results in this work provide fairness guarantees that hold regardless
of valuations of the agents, better guarantees can be obtained in many instances if we
take the valuations into account. For example, even though an envy-free allocation
does not always exist, it is known that such an allocation exists most of the time when
valuations are drawn at random [Dickerson et al., 2014; Manurangsi and Suksompong,
2019]. On a complete graph, deciding the existence of an envy-free allocation is NP-hard
even for two agents with identical valuations [Lipton et al., 2004]. By contrast, this
problem can be solved efficiently on a tree or a cycle for any constant number of agents,
since we can simply go through all of the (polynomially many) connected allocations;
yet, the problem again becomes NP-hard even on a path if the number of agents is
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non-constant [Bouveret et al., 2017]. Similar computational questions can be asked for
other combinations of graphs and fairness notions without guaranteed existence, and
we believe that these questions constitute an important direction that deserves to be
pursued in future work.
A. Algorithm for Theorem 3.7
In this section, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an allocation that
gives both agents at least 3/4 of their MMS when the graph is biconnected. As in
Theorem 3.3, it suffices to compute a bipartition such that the first agent has value at
least 3/4 of her MMS for both parts; the second agent can then choose the part that she
prefers.
To compute such a bipartition, we iterate over all pairs of goods g1, g2. For each pair,
we construct a bipolar ordering that begins with g1 and ends with g2; this is possible as
explained in the proof of Theorem 3.7. We then consider taking every possible prefix of
the ordering as one part of the bipartition, and return the bipartition with the highest
minimum between the two parts across all pairs g1, g2. The pseudocode of the algorithm
is given as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Approximate MMS Algorithm for Biconnected Graphs
1: procedure ApproximateMMS(M,G, u)
2: current-best ← 0
3: M1 ← ∅
4: M2 ←M
5: for (g1, g2) ∈M ×M with g1 6= g2 do
6: Construct a bipolar ordering σ of G starting with g1 and ending with g2.
7: for g ∈M do
8: M ′1 ← {all goods before g in σ}
9: M ′2 ← {g and all goods after g in σ}
10: if min{u(M ′1), u(M
′
2)} > current-best then
11: current-best ← min{u(M ′1), u(M
′
2)}
12: M1 ←M
′
1
13: M2 ←M
′
2
14: return (M1,M2)
Since constructing a bipolar ordering with a specific cycle as the first ear can be done in
linear time [Schmidt, 2013], Algorithm 2 runs in polynomial time. We now establish the
correctness of the algorithm. Assume without loss of generality that MMS(u, 2) = 1/2,
so there exists a bipartition (M1,M2) ofM such that u(M1) = 1/2 ≤ u(M2).
12 Consider
a modified valuation u′ where we start with u and arbitrarily decrease the values of some
goods inM2 so that u
′(M2) = 1/2. In the new instance, the proof of Theorem 3.7 implies
12Note that we are not assuming u(M) = 1 as in the proof of Theorem 3.7.
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that there exists a connected bipartition for which both parts have value at least 3/8,
and this bipartition corresponds to one of the bipartitions examined by Algorithm 2.
Since the values in the original instance with valuation u can only be higher than in the
new instance with valuation u′, in the original instance both parts of this bipartition
also have value at least 3/8. It follows that both parts of the bipartition returned by
Algorithm 2 have value at least 3/8, which is 3/4 of the MMS.
B. Double Round-Robin Algorithm
In this section, we provide a simple polynomial-time algorithm for computing a connected
EF1 allocation among n agents with additive valuations, when the graph is a complete
bipartite graph Ka,b with a, b ≥ n. Let L and R denote the set of vertices on the left and
right side of the graph, respectively. The algorithm proceeds by running the classical
round-robin algorithm twice, once on L and once on R, with opposite orderings of the
agents. The pseudocode is shown as Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Double Round-Robin Algorithm
1: procedure DoubleRoundRobin(N,L,R, u1, . . . , un)
2: M1, . . . ,Mn ← ∅
3: i = 1
4: while L 6= ∅ do
5: j ← highest-valued good in L according to ui
6: Move j from L to Mi.
7: i← i+ 1
8: if i = n+ 1 then
9: i = 1
10: i = n
11: while R 6= ∅ do
12: j ← highest-valued good in R according to ui
13: Move j from R to Mi.
14: i← i− 1
15: if i = 0 then
16: i = n
17: return (M1, . . . ,Mn)
Since a, b ≥ n, every agent receives at least one good from each of L and R, so the
resulting allocation is connected. We claim that it is EF1. To see this, consider two
agents i, i′ with i < i′. When allocating each of the sets L and R, we consider a round to
begin when i picks a good, and end just before the next time i picks a good (or when the
set runs out of goods). During the allocation of L, in each round i picks before i′. Since
the valuations are additive, i does not envy i′ with respect to the goods in L. Similarly,
i does not envy i′ in each round during the allocation of R. The only possible source of
envy is before the first round starts, when i′ picks her first good. However, this means
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that the envy can be eliminated if we remove this good from the bundle of i′. Hence i
does not envy i′ up to one good in total; an analogous argument shows that i′ also does
not envy i up to one good. Since i and i′ are arbitrary, the allocation is EF1.
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